Explication and Operationalization in ScienceDiversity and RepresentationRobustness Reasoning |
Scientists often need to explicate and operationalize concepts that come from outside scientific contexts in order to study them. For example, social scientists need to explicate their understanding of 'racism' and operationalize it in observational and experimental contexts prior to conducting studies on the causes or effects of racism. I aim to understand how social, political, and ethical values play a role in choices about how to explicate and operationalize these concepts for scientific purposes.
Diversity and representation in any group make a difference to how that group interacts and what knowledge they can produce. I am interested in questions about what sorts of diversity and representation provide access to new knowledge, what the power and limitations of diversity and representation are addressing oppression, and how to assess the causes of diversity and representation in some group. Following the latter question, I have done empirical research on why women and Black students are underrepresented in philosophy relative to men and White students.
It seems that supporting a claim with multiple lines of reasoning or evidence provides better support than a single line of reasoning or piece of evidence alone. Yet, there are many open questions regarding this sort of robustness reasoning. I am interested in questions about the contexts in which this robustness reasoning is useful, its limitations, and its underlying inferential structure.
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Publications
*Morgan Thompson. (Forthcoming). Epistemic Risk in Triangulation: The Case of Implicit Attitudes. Synthese. [pre-print]
*Nick Byrd & Morgan Thompson. (2022). Testing for Implicit Bias: Values, Psychometrics, and Science Communication. WIRES Cognitive Science.
*Morgan Thompson. (2020). Psychological Research on Racial Microaggressions: Community Science and Concept Explication. In Microaggressions and Philosophy. Eds. Lauren Freeman and Jeanine Weekes Schroer. Routledge. [pre-print]
*Morgan Thompson. (2017). Explaining the Gender Gap in Philosophy. Philosophy Compass. 12(3): e12406 [PhilPapers]
*Morgan Thompson, Toni Adleberg, Sam Sims, and Eddy Nahmias. (2016). Why Do Women Leave Philosophy? Surveying Students at the Introductory Level. Philosophers' Imprint. 16(6), 1-36. [open access]
Liam Kofi Bright, Daniel Malinsky, and Morgan Thompson. (2016). Causally Interpreting Intersectionality Theory. Philosophy of Science. 83(1), 60-81. [Academia.edu]
*Toni Adleberg, Morgan Thompson, and Eddy Nahmias. (2014). Do Men and Women Have Different Philosophical Intuitions? Further Data. Philosophical Psychology. 28(5), 615-41. [Academia.edu, PhilPapers]
Eddy Nahmias and Morgan Thompson. (2014). A Naturalistic Vision of Free Will. In Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy, ed. by E. O’Neill and E. Machery. New York: Routledge. 86-103. [PhilPapers]
* indicates primary or shared first authorship
*Nick Byrd & Morgan Thompson. (2022). Testing for Implicit Bias: Values, Psychometrics, and Science Communication. WIRES Cognitive Science.
*Morgan Thompson. (2020). Psychological Research on Racial Microaggressions: Community Science and Concept Explication. In Microaggressions and Philosophy. Eds. Lauren Freeman and Jeanine Weekes Schroer. Routledge. [pre-print]
*Morgan Thompson. (2017). Explaining the Gender Gap in Philosophy. Philosophy Compass. 12(3): e12406 [PhilPapers]
- Philosophy blog posts: DailyNous
*Morgan Thompson, Toni Adleberg, Sam Sims, and Eddy Nahmias. (2016). Why Do Women Leave Philosophy? Surveying Students at the Introductory Level. Philosophers' Imprint. 16(6), 1-36. [open access]
- Media coverage: NPR 13.7: Culture and Cosmos, Inside Higher Ed
- Philosophy blog posts: DailyNous, NewApps, Feminist Philosophers
Liam Kofi Bright, Daniel Malinsky, and Morgan Thompson. (2016). Causally Interpreting Intersectionality Theory. Philosophy of Science. 83(1), 60-81. [Academia.edu]
*Toni Adleberg, Morgan Thompson, and Eddy Nahmias. (2014). Do Men and Women Have Different Philosophical Intuitions? Further Data. Philosophical Psychology. 28(5), 615-41. [Academia.edu, PhilPapers]
- Philosophy blog posts: Experimental Philosophy, The Brains Blog
Eddy Nahmias and Morgan Thompson. (2014). A Naturalistic Vision of Free Will. In Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy, ed. by E. O’Neill and E. Machery. New York: Routledge. 86-103. [PhilPapers]
* indicates primary or shared first authorship
In Progress & Drafts
*Morgan Thompson. Paper on difficulties operationalizing experiences of racial discrimination. [R&R]
Measuring racial discrimination is important in order to identify it's harmful health impacts (among other reasons). Sociologists and psychologists typically focus on measuring experiences of racial discrimination by self-report surveys. Two clear targets of what ought to be considered racial discriminatory experiences are microaggressions and intersectionally discriminatory experiences. Yet, these discriminatory experiences are not captured by some of the most common survey instruments. Further, microaggressions and intersectionally discriminatory experiences cannot be measure using the same survey.
Morgan Thompson. Paper on coherentism in philosophy of measurement.
Measures of the same construct sometimes make similar assumptions about the nature of the construct. In the social sciences, where constructs are multi-faceted, similar measures often ignore important dimensions of the construct. I argue that in some cases this lack of measure diversity is due to path dependence in measurement development and validation. Early decisions in characterizing the construct constrain the development and validation of future measures. I argue that adopting coherentist norms of justification, such as Chang's epistemic iteration or Tal's model-based account of measurement, are sufficient to produce path dependence. To avoid such path dependence, coherentist views need norms that promote (rather than simply allowing) diverse characterizations of the construct initially.
Morgan Thompson. Paper on conflicts among the political, ethical, and epistemic justifications for community science.
Scientists have become increasingly interested in including the public in the process of scientific research, involving the public in a range of activities from setting the agenda, collecting data, choosing methods, and identifying social impact of the research. Philosophers of science have recently called for science to be more democratized. I distinguish different justifications for including public communities in scientific research: concerns of political legitimacy of research, the desire to correct historical moral inadequacies of scientific research and respect marginalized communities, and the epistemic benefits of diverse viewpoints. However, I claim that these different justifications sometimes recommend incompatible procedures for community science. Thus, practitioners of community science, and philosophers of science who call for it, ought to be clear about which justification(s) they take to be of primary importance.
*Morgan Thompson. Paper on robustness analysis.
I argue that there is a role for robustness analysis in contexts of discovery and pursuit that has not yet been elaborated in the philosophical literature. I provide an account of how robustness analysis is used to explore possible growth principles in network neuroscience and biology where well accepted models of the target system already exist (e.g., C. elegans wiring diagram). This function of robustness analysis has received less attention in the philosophical literature due to the primary focus on the debate about whether (and how) robustness analysis could provide confirmation.
Morgan Thompson, Liam Kofi Bright, and Erich Kummerfeld. Why Do Black Students Leave Philosophy? Surveying Students at the Introductory Level.
David Colaço, Morgan Thompson, and Brendan McVeigh. Paper on demographics of philosophy and psychology.
* indicates draft available upon request.
Measuring racial discrimination is important in order to identify it's harmful health impacts (among other reasons). Sociologists and psychologists typically focus on measuring experiences of racial discrimination by self-report surveys. Two clear targets of what ought to be considered racial discriminatory experiences are microaggressions and intersectionally discriminatory experiences. Yet, these discriminatory experiences are not captured by some of the most common survey instruments. Further, microaggressions and intersectionally discriminatory experiences cannot be measure using the same survey.
Morgan Thompson. Paper on coherentism in philosophy of measurement.
Measures of the same construct sometimes make similar assumptions about the nature of the construct. In the social sciences, where constructs are multi-faceted, similar measures often ignore important dimensions of the construct. I argue that in some cases this lack of measure diversity is due to path dependence in measurement development and validation. Early decisions in characterizing the construct constrain the development and validation of future measures. I argue that adopting coherentist norms of justification, such as Chang's epistemic iteration or Tal's model-based account of measurement, are sufficient to produce path dependence. To avoid such path dependence, coherentist views need norms that promote (rather than simply allowing) diverse characterizations of the construct initially.
Morgan Thompson. Paper on conflicts among the political, ethical, and epistemic justifications for community science.
Scientists have become increasingly interested in including the public in the process of scientific research, involving the public in a range of activities from setting the agenda, collecting data, choosing methods, and identifying social impact of the research. Philosophers of science have recently called for science to be more democratized. I distinguish different justifications for including public communities in scientific research: concerns of political legitimacy of research, the desire to correct historical moral inadequacies of scientific research and respect marginalized communities, and the epistemic benefits of diverse viewpoints. However, I claim that these different justifications sometimes recommend incompatible procedures for community science. Thus, practitioners of community science, and philosophers of science who call for it, ought to be clear about which justification(s) they take to be of primary importance.
*Morgan Thompson. Paper on robustness analysis.
I argue that there is a role for robustness analysis in contexts of discovery and pursuit that has not yet been elaborated in the philosophical literature. I provide an account of how robustness analysis is used to explore possible growth principles in network neuroscience and biology where well accepted models of the target system already exist (e.g., C. elegans wiring diagram). This function of robustness analysis has received less attention in the philosophical literature due to the primary focus on the debate about whether (and how) robustness analysis could provide confirmation.
Morgan Thompson, Liam Kofi Bright, and Erich Kummerfeld. Why Do Black Students Leave Philosophy? Surveying Students at the Introductory Level.
David Colaço, Morgan Thompson, and Brendan McVeigh. Paper on demographics of philosophy and psychology.
* indicates draft available upon request.
Public Philosophy and Other Writing
Brains Blog Roundtable discussion on values in cognitive science with Shen-yi Liao, Uwe Peters, and Morgan Thompson. https://philosophyofbrains.com/2022/03/14/brains-blog-roundtable-values-in-cognitive-science.aspx
Eric Schwitzgebel, Liam Kofi Bright, Carolyn Dicey Jennings, Morgan Thompson, and Eric Winsberg. 2021. The Diversity of Philosophy Students and Faculty. The Philosopher’s Magazine Vol.93 No.1: 71-90
Morgan Thompson. 2021. Underrepresentation in Philosophy of Science and What We Can Do About It. Science Visions. Vol 3. No. 1. [Note: Newsletter of the Philosophy of Science Association's Women's Caucus]
Eric Schwitzgebel, Morgan Thompson, Eric Winsberg. 2020. Gender and Sexual Orientation of First-Year Philosophy Students in the U.S. The Splintered Mind.
Morgan Thompson. 2017. The Gender Gap in Philosophy. The Daily Nous.
Morgan Thompson. 2016. Why do Undergratuate Women Stop Studying Philosophy? The Daily Nous.
Toni Adleberg, Morgan Thompson, and Eddy Nahmias. 2013. Do Women Have Different Philosophical Intuitions than Men? Responding to Buckwalter and Stich. The Brains Blog.
Eric Schwitzgebel, Liam Kofi Bright, Carolyn Dicey Jennings, Morgan Thompson, and Eric Winsberg. 2021. The Diversity of Philosophy Students and Faculty. The Philosopher’s Magazine Vol.93 No.1: 71-90
Morgan Thompson. 2021. Underrepresentation in Philosophy of Science and What We Can Do About It. Science Visions. Vol 3. No. 1. [Note: Newsletter of the Philosophy of Science Association's Women's Caucus]
Eric Schwitzgebel, Morgan Thompson, Eric Winsberg. 2020. Gender and Sexual Orientation of First-Year Philosophy Students in the U.S. The Splintered Mind.
Morgan Thompson. 2017. The Gender Gap in Philosophy. The Daily Nous.
Morgan Thompson. 2016. Why do Undergratuate Women Stop Studying Philosophy? The Daily Nous.
Toni Adleberg, Morgan Thompson, and Eddy Nahmias. 2013. Do Women Have Different Philosophical Intuitions than Men? Responding to Buckwalter and Stich. The Brains Blog.