Publications
*Morgan Thompson. (Forthcoming). Psychological Research on Racial Microaggressions: Community Science and Concept Explication. In Microaggressions and Philosophy. Eds. Lauren Freeman and Jeanine Weekes Schroer. Routledge.
*Morgan Thompson. (2017). Explaining the Gender Gap in Philosophy. Philosophy Compass. 12(3): e12406
*Morgan Thompson, Toni Adleberg, Sam Sims, and Eddy Nahmias. (2016). Why Do Women Leave Philosophy? Surveying Students at the Introductory Level. Philosophers' Imprint. 16(6), 1-36.
Liam Kofi Bright, Daniel Malinsky, and Morgan Thompson. (2016). Causally Interpreting Intersectionality Theory. Philosophy of Science. 83(1), 60-81. [Academia.edu]
*Toni Adleberg, Morgan Thompson, and Eddy Nahmias. (2014). Do Men and Women Have Different Philosophical Intuitions? Further Data. Philosophical Psychology. 28(5), 615-41. [Academia.edu, PhilPapers]
Eddy Nahmias and Morgan Thompson. (2014). A Naturalistic Vision of Free Will. In Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy, ed. by E. O’Neill and E. Machery. New York: Routledge. 86-103. [PhilPapers]
* indicates primary authorship
*Morgan Thompson. (2017). Explaining the Gender Gap in Philosophy. Philosophy Compass. 12(3): e12406
- Philosophy blog posts: DailyNous
*Morgan Thompson, Toni Adleberg, Sam Sims, and Eddy Nahmias. (2016). Why Do Women Leave Philosophy? Surveying Students at the Introductory Level. Philosophers' Imprint. 16(6), 1-36.
- Media coverage: NPR 13.7: Culture and Cosmos, Inside Higher Ed
- Philosophy blog posts: DailyNous, NewApps, Feminist Philosophers
Liam Kofi Bright, Daniel Malinsky, and Morgan Thompson. (2016). Causally Interpreting Intersectionality Theory. Philosophy of Science. 83(1), 60-81. [Academia.edu]
*Toni Adleberg, Morgan Thompson, and Eddy Nahmias. (2014). Do Men and Women Have Different Philosophical Intuitions? Further Data. Philosophical Psychology. 28(5), 615-41. [Academia.edu, PhilPapers]
- Philosophy blog posts: Experimental Philosophy, The Brains Blog
Eddy Nahmias and Morgan Thompson. (2014). A Naturalistic Vision of Free Will. In Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy, ed. by E. O’Neill and E. Machery. New York: Routledge. 86-103. [PhilPapers]
* indicates primary authorship
In Progress & Drafts
Morgan Thompson, Liam Kofi Bright, and Erich Kummerfeld. Why Do Black Students Leave Philosophy? Surveying Students at the Introductory Level.
*Morgan Thompson. Robustness Analysis in Network Neuroscience.
I argue that there is a role for robustness analysis in discovery that has not yet been explored in the philosophical literature. To do so, I illustrate two types of robustness analysis procedures and demonstrate their use in the relatively recent research program of network neuroscience. My account of a new type of robustness analysis—scope robustness analysis—and the received view of robustness analysis demonstrates that they are: appropriate in different epistemic situations regarding the target system, have different success and failure conditions, are prone to misapplication in different ways. Scope robustness analysis better accounts for robustness analysis used to explore possible growth principles in network neuroscience and biology where well accepted models of the target system already exist (e.g., C. elegans wiring diagram). And the function of the received view of robustness analysis need not be limited to confirmation.
Morgan Thompson. Illusions of Methodological Triangulation: The Case of Implicit Social Cognition
Methodological triangulation is the practice of using multiple diverse methods to examine the same research question. While the majority of philosophers focus on the benefits of triangulation, the few critiques of triangulation concern the extent to which the methods are diverse—a failure of diversity. In this chapter, I argue that another more insidious failure, the failure to triangulate, can occur when researchers do not get the same result from the different methods. The failure to triangulate can also spur researchers to commit a failure of diversity. I use the case of implicit social cognition to illustrate both types of failure.
Morgan Thompson. Topological Explanation in Neuroscience: From Network Models to the Brain.
Some mechanists hold that all explanation in neuroscience is mechanistic. Other philosophers of science have argued that topological explanations, in which the behavior of a system can be derived purely from the topological properties of that system, are an alternative explanatory strategy in ecology and evolutionary biology. I argue topological explanations exist within neuroscience and are non-mechanistic. In particular, neuroscientists explain the robustness and vulnerability of the macroscale human brain to perturbation by appeal to the topological property of small-worldness. I consider objections that the case is either: (i) not explanatory or (ii) mechanistic. I conclude that these mechanists should deny the claim that all explanation in neuroscience is mechanistic.
* indicates draft available upon request.
*Morgan Thompson. Robustness Analysis in Network Neuroscience.
I argue that there is a role for robustness analysis in discovery that has not yet been explored in the philosophical literature. To do so, I illustrate two types of robustness analysis procedures and demonstrate their use in the relatively recent research program of network neuroscience. My account of a new type of robustness analysis—scope robustness analysis—and the received view of robustness analysis demonstrates that they are: appropriate in different epistemic situations regarding the target system, have different success and failure conditions, are prone to misapplication in different ways. Scope robustness analysis better accounts for robustness analysis used to explore possible growth principles in network neuroscience and biology where well accepted models of the target system already exist (e.g., C. elegans wiring diagram). And the function of the received view of robustness analysis need not be limited to confirmation.
Morgan Thompson. Illusions of Methodological Triangulation: The Case of Implicit Social Cognition
Methodological triangulation is the practice of using multiple diverse methods to examine the same research question. While the majority of philosophers focus on the benefits of triangulation, the few critiques of triangulation concern the extent to which the methods are diverse—a failure of diversity. In this chapter, I argue that another more insidious failure, the failure to triangulate, can occur when researchers do not get the same result from the different methods. The failure to triangulate can also spur researchers to commit a failure of diversity. I use the case of implicit social cognition to illustrate both types of failure.
Morgan Thompson. Topological Explanation in Neuroscience: From Network Models to the Brain.
Some mechanists hold that all explanation in neuroscience is mechanistic. Other philosophers of science have argued that topological explanations, in which the behavior of a system can be derived purely from the topological properties of that system, are an alternative explanatory strategy in ecology and evolutionary biology. I argue topological explanations exist within neuroscience and are non-mechanistic. In particular, neuroscientists explain the robustness and vulnerability of the macroscale human brain to perturbation by appeal to the topological property of small-worldness. I consider objections that the case is either: (i) not explanatory or (ii) mechanistic. I conclude that these mechanists should deny the claim that all explanation in neuroscience is mechanistic.
* indicates draft available upon request.
Presentations
*Can Methodological Triangulation Save Implicit Attitudes from the Replication Crisis?
*Robustness Analysis in Network Neuroscience
*Making Introductory Philosophy of Science Courses More Inclusive
*"Intersectionality: What is it and how can we test for it?" and "Intersectionality in the Classroom"
*Exploratory Experimentation in Neuroscience: The Gendered Connectome
*Flexible Pedagogy as a Tool for Building an Inclusive Classroom (with Liam Kofi Bright) [invited]
On Delusion and the Ascription of Belief (with Mahi Hardalupas and Evan Pence)
*Limiting the Scope of Mechanistic Explanation
*Retaining Black Students in Philosophy (with Liam Kofi Bright)
Comments on Laura Ruetsche's "What is it like to be a woman in philosophy of physics?" [invited]
Causally Interpreting Intersectionality Theory (with Liam Kofi Bright and Daniel Malinsky)
*Can There Be Spatially Distributed Parts in a Mechanistic Explanation?
*Changing our Syllabi and Explaining Philosophy’s Relevance
*Women and Philosophy: Why is it ‘Goodbye’ at ‘Hello’? (with Toni Adleberg)
*Causal Compatibilism: A Nonreductive Physicalist Solution to the Exclusion Problem
* indicates primary presenter or co-presenter
- Replication of Crises: Psychology in Times of Epistemic Upheaval at the University of Lübeck (September 2019).
*Robustness Analysis in Network Neuroscience
- Society for the Philosophy of Science in Practice in Ghent, Belgium (June 2018).
- Philosophy of Science Association in Seattle, Washington (November 2018).
- American Philosophical Association Central Division Meeting in Denver, Colorado (February 2019).
- American Association of Philosophy Teachers in Greensboro, North Carolina (July 2018).
*Making Introductory Philosophy of Science Courses More Inclusive
- American Association of Philosophy Teachers in Greensboro, North Carolina (July 2018). See slides here and data from survey of philosophy of science syllabi here. Resources handout can be found here.
*"Intersectionality: What is it and how can we test for it?" and "Intersectionality in the Classroom"
- Institutional Change through Faculty Advancement in Instruction and Mentoring. Jackson State University, Mississippi (May 2018).
*Exploratory Experimentation in Neuroscience: The Gendered Connectome
- Philosophy of Science Association meeting in Atlanta, Georgia (November 2016).
*Flexible Pedagogy as a Tool for Building an Inclusive Classroom (with Liam Kofi Bright) [invited]
- Implicit Bias/Stereotype Threat and Pedagogy hosted by Minorities and Philosophy (MAP) at Princeton University (October 2016).
On Delusion and the Ascription of Belief (with Mahi Hardalupas and Evan Pence)
- Buffalo Annual Experimental Philosophy Conference at University at Buffalo (September 2016).
*Limiting the Scope of Mechanistic Explanation
- Society for the Philosophy of Science in Practice at Aarhus University, Denmark (June 2015).
- Society for Philosophy and Psychology (Poster presentation) at Duke University (June 2015).
*Retaining Black Students in Philosophy (with Liam Kofi Bright)
- Hypatia/Committee on the Status of Women Conference at Villanova University (May 2015).
Comments on Laura Ruetsche's "What is it like to be a woman in philosophy of physics?" [invited]
- Workshop in Honor of Jim Bogen (March 2015).
Causally Interpreting Intersectionality Theory (with Liam Kofi Bright and Daniel Malinsky)
- Perspectives on Gender at the University of California at Irvine (October 2014).
*Can There Be Spatially Distributed Parts in a Mechanistic Explanation?
- Society for Philosophy and Psychology at the University of British Columbia, Canada (June 2014).
*Changing our Syllabi and Explaining Philosophy’s Relevance
- APA Committee for the Status of Women Panel at the Central American Philosophical Association meeting in Chicago (February 2014).
- UNC Workshop on the Recruitment and Retention of Female Undergraduates in Philosophy (April 2014). [invited]
*Women and Philosophy: Why is it ‘Goodbye’ at ‘Hello’? (with Toni Adleberg)
- Implicit Bias, Philosophy and Psychology at the University of Sheffield, England (April 2013).
- Diversity in Philosophy at the University of Dayton (May 2013).
- Society for Philosophy and Psychology at Brown University (June 2013).
*Causal Compatibilism: A Nonreductive Physicalist Solution to the Exclusion Problem
- Phi Sigma Tau Graduate Conference at Georgia State University (April 2013).
* indicates primary presenter or co-presenter