Robustness ReasoningExplication and Operationalization in ScienceDiversity and Representation |
It seems that supporting a claim with multiple lines of reasoning or evidence provides better support than a single line of reasoning or piece of evidence alone. Yet, there are many open questions regarding this sort of robustness reasoning. I am interested in questions about the contexts in which this robustness reasoning is useful, its limitations, and its underlying inferential structure.
Scientists often need to explicate and operationalize concepts that come from outside scientific contexts in order to study them. For example, social scientists need to explicate their understanding of 'racism' and operationalize it in observational and experimental contexts prior to conducting studies on the causes or effects of racism. I aim to understand how social, political, and ethical values play a role in choices about how to explicate and operationalize these concepts for scientific purposes.
Diversity and representation in any group make a difference to how that group interacts and what knowledge they can produce. I am interested in questions about what sorts of diversity and representation provide access to new knowledge, what the power and limitations of diversity and representation are addressing oppression, and how to assess the causes of diversity and representation in some group. Following the latter question, I have done empirical research on why women and Black students are underrepresented in philosophy relative to men and White students.
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Publications
*Morgan Thompson. (Forthcoming). Psychological Research on Racial Microaggressions: Community Science and Concept Explication. In Microaggressions and Philosophy. Eds. Lauren Freeman and Jeanine Weekes Schroer. Routledge. [pre-print]
*Morgan Thompson. (2017). Explaining the Gender Gap in Philosophy. Philosophy Compass. 12(3): e12406 [PhilPapers]
*Morgan Thompson, Toni Adleberg, Sam Sims, and Eddy Nahmias. (2016). Why Do Women Leave Philosophy? Surveying Students at the Introductory Level. Philosophers' Imprint. 16(6), 1-36. [open access]
Liam Kofi Bright, Daniel Malinsky, and Morgan Thompson. (2016). Causally Interpreting Intersectionality Theory. Philosophy of Science. 83(1), 60-81. [Academia.edu]
*Toni Adleberg, Morgan Thompson, and Eddy Nahmias. (2014). Do Men and Women Have Different Philosophical Intuitions? Further Data. Philosophical Psychology. 28(5), 615-41. [Academia.edu, PhilPapers]
Eddy Nahmias and Morgan Thompson. (2014). A Naturalistic Vision of Free Will. In Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy, ed. by E. O’Neill and E. Machery. New York: Routledge. 86-103. [PhilPapers]
* indicates primary authorship
*Morgan Thompson. (2017). Explaining the Gender Gap in Philosophy. Philosophy Compass. 12(3): e12406 [PhilPapers]
- Philosophy blog posts: DailyNous
*Morgan Thompson, Toni Adleberg, Sam Sims, and Eddy Nahmias. (2016). Why Do Women Leave Philosophy? Surveying Students at the Introductory Level. Philosophers' Imprint. 16(6), 1-36. [open access]
- Media coverage: NPR 13.7: Culture and Cosmos, Inside Higher Ed
- Philosophy blog posts: DailyNous, NewApps, Feminist Philosophers
Liam Kofi Bright, Daniel Malinsky, and Morgan Thompson. (2016). Causally Interpreting Intersectionality Theory. Philosophy of Science. 83(1), 60-81. [Academia.edu]
*Toni Adleberg, Morgan Thompson, and Eddy Nahmias. (2014). Do Men and Women Have Different Philosophical Intuitions? Further Data. Philosophical Psychology. 28(5), 615-41. [Academia.edu, PhilPapers]
- Philosophy blog posts: Experimental Philosophy, The Brains Blog
Eddy Nahmias and Morgan Thompson. (2014). A Naturalistic Vision of Free Will. In Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy, ed. by E. O’Neill and E. Machery. New York: Routledge. 86-103. [PhilPapers]
* indicates primary authorship
In Progress & Drafts
Morgan Thompson, Liam Kofi Bright, and Erich Kummerfeld. Why Do Black Students Leave Philosophy? Surveying Students at the Introductory Level.
David Colaço, Morgan Thompson, and Brendan McVeigh. Paper on demographics of philosophy and psychology.
*Morgan Thompson. Paper on robustness analysis.
I argue that there is a role for robustness analysis in contexts of discovery and pursuit that has not yet been elaborated in the philosophical literature. I provide an account of how robustness analysis is used to explore possible growth principles in network neuroscience and biology where well accepted models of the target system already exist (e.g., C. elegans wiring diagram). This function of robustness analysis has received less attention in the philosophical literature due to the primary focus on the debate about whether (and how) robustness analysis could provide confirmation.
Morgan Thompson. Paper on epistemic risk and triangulation.
Methodological triangulation is the practice of using multiple diverse methods to examine the same research question. While the majority of philosophers focus on why triangulation succeeds, the few critiques of triangulation concern the extent to which the methods can fail to be diverse. I argue that an account of triangulation focused on epistemic risk is better able to describe how triangulation fails and to normatively guide future triangulation research. I provide an account of triangulation that focuses on types of epistemic risk and the conditions under which it arises. I demonstrate that my account can explain why triangulation fails in current implicit attitude research.
Morgan Thompson. Paper on the explanatory view of diversity among models/methods in robustness analysis.
One important strategy for dealing with error in our methods is triangulation, or the use multiple methods to investigate the same hypothesis. There are two major success criteria in all current accounts of triangulation: (i) the methods employed need to be sufficient diverse and (ii) the methods need to provide evidence about the same phenomenon. One recent and influential view of the criterion of "sufficient diversity" is Schupbach's explanatory account. I argue that Schupbach's account trades on the similarity between Perrin's triangulation argument for the estimation of Avogadro's number and Perrin's design of experiments to demonstrate Brownian motion. Due to differences in the characterization of the underlying inferences, the former is a case of robustness reasoning (i.e., triangulation) while the latter is not.
* indicates draft available upon request.
David Colaço, Morgan Thompson, and Brendan McVeigh. Paper on demographics of philosophy and psychology.
*Morgan Thompson. Paper on robustness analysis.
I argue that there is a role for robustness analysis in contexts of discovery and pursuit that has not yet been elaborated in the philosophical literature. I provide an account of how robustness analysis is used to explore possible growth principles in network neuroscience and biology where well accepted models of the target system already exist (e.g., C. elegans wiring diagram). This function of robustness analysis has received less attention in the philosophical literature due to the primary focus on the debate about whether (and how) robustness analysis could provide confirmation.
Morgan Thompson. Paper on epistemic risk and triangulation.
Methodological triangulation is the practice of using multiple diverse methods to examine the same research question. While the majority of philosophers focus on why triangulation succeeds, the few critiques of triangulation concern the extent to which the methods can fail to be diverse. I argue that an account of triangulation focused on epistemic risk is better able to describe how triangulation fails and to normatively guide future triangulation research. I provide an account of triangulation that focuses on types of epistemic risk and the conditions under which it arises. I demonstrate that my account can explain why triangulation fails in current implicit attitude research.
Morgan Thompson. Paper on the explanatory view of diversity among models/methods in robustness analysis.
One important strategy for dealing with error in our methods is triangulation, or the use multiple methods to investigate the same hypothesis. There are two major success criteria in all current accounts of triangulation: (i) the methods employed need to be sufficient diverse and (ii) the methods need to provide evidence about the same phenomenon. One recent and influential view of the criterion of "sufficient diversity" is Schupbach's explanatory account. I argue that Schupbach's account trades on the similarity between Perrin's triangulation argument for the estimation of Avogadro's number and Perrin's design of experiments to demonstrate Brownian motion. Due to differences in the characterization of the underlying inferences, the former is a case of robustness reasoning (i.e., triangulation) while the latter is not.
* indicates draft available upon request.